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}HERING may rightly be regarded as the founder of the theory under 
discussion for he it was who suggested that if for some reason or 
another a contract is not concluded, then the question would arise 
as to whether one of the parties was to blame for this during the 
negotiations and therefore liable to pay an indemnity to the other 
party. 
The basis of his thesis is the tacit preliminary agreement of 
mutual responsibility which is intimately connected with the 
future contract. 
Such a general theory was based on certain passages in the 
Digest relating to sale which is null ab initio, and was later,ex­
tended to cases where contracts were frustrated owing to the 
unjustified falling out of one of the parties. 
In spite of the fact that Jhering's theory of culpa in contrahendo 
is based on culpa, several writers point out that the passages 
from the Digest which he actually quoted, refer to 'bad faith'. In 
reality 'bad faith' lies somewhere between malice and negligence 
and it provided for the successful action of a plaintiff who, though 
unable to prove dolus on the part of the defendant, brought evi­
dence to show that objectively the defendant was in bad faith. 
CLASSIFICATION: 
Glancing at the question of classification, Carbonnier says that 
when a contract has been annulled because of fraud, an action for 
precontractual responsibility would be classified as a contractual 
sanction. On the other hand, when a case arises of abrupt termina­
tion of negotiations, which means that no contract has been con-
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eluded at all, it would be regarded as delictual, for it would result 
from the non-performance of the legal obligation of nemin em l ae­
dere. 
Assuming the doctrine of precontractual liability to be part of 
Maltese law, one wonders whether it is contractual, quasi-con­
tractual or delictual in nature. Precontractual responsibilicy is not 
deemed to be contractual, because the obligation to negotiate in 
accordance with the rules of good faith not only precedes the 
obligation that emerges from the future contract, but it subsists 
on its own even if the future contract remains inexistent. 
Secondly, the immediate cause of a quasi-contract is the per­
formance of a lawful and voluntary act which gives rise to a reci­
procal obligation between the parties independently of the identity 
between their acts of volition. The quasi-contracts of negotiomm 
gestio and indebiti solutio have, as their essential element, the 
material advantage which one party procures in favour of another. 
On the contrary, precontractual responsibility implies that one of 
the parties has suffered some form of damage as a result of the 
other party's dishonest behaviour. 
Thirdly, delict and quasi-delict are causes of obligations be­
cause a person causing damage is bound to make good such dam­
age on the precept of natural justice, nemin em laedere. Since the 
notions of delict and quasi-delict are wide enough to include any 
unjust act that causes harm, then the dishonest acts of a negotia­
ting party causing harm could be classified as delictual in nature. 
THE GERMAN POSITION: 
The German Civil Code in article 242 states, 'The debtor is 
obliged to satisfy his obligation in the way that good faith, with 
respect to the usual customs, necessitates'. 
Cohn 1 writes, 'the principles of contractual liability have been 
extended by numerous court decisions so as to cover cases in 
which a contract has not in fact been concluded, but where the 
parties have entered into legal relations with a view to concluding 
a contract. This is culpa in contrahendo first brought to light by 
Jhering'. He then goes on to cite a case decided by the Old Im­
perial Court; 
Miss B. went to the department score of Messrs. C. & Co. to buy 
food. On the way to the food department she crossed the carpet 
department where, owing to the negligence of a shop assistant, a 
carpet fell down and injured her. Precontractual damages were 
awarded to Miss B. on the ground that she was 'about to contract' 
1 A Manual of German Law (Part 1) 2nd edition, p. 123.
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m the food department, that is, she was 10 the preconttactual 
stage. 
Such a case quoted as an example of the theory is extremely 
weird. It would seem to be a case of tortious liability, namely 
whether or not the owners of the store were diligent in employing 
the assistant. 
THE ELEMENTS OF THE DOCTRINE: 
The first element that the concept of precontractual liability 
involves is the relationship that exists before the conclusion of 
the contract together with the intention to conclude such contract. 
Such intention is seen to be important in relation to the 'sphere of 
the contract'. For example, Miss B. was in the sphere of her con­
tract when she got hurt, but where X and Y entered a shop to steal 
and to shelter from the rain respectively, the court said that they 
were not in the sphere of a contract and therefore, the first re­
quirement of the theory was missing, disallowing them to sue for 
precontractual damages. 
The second element is the violation of a minor obligation of the 
precontractual stage and we meet with the third element in article 
276 of the German Civil Code which provides for the intention or 
negligence of the defendant. 
Whereas Jhering's theory was based on honest acts, we notice 
here a radical departure, since article 276 specifically provides 
for cases of negligence. And, when we remember that attic le 242 
of the same German Civil Code provides for good faith, we wonder 
whether good faith includes cases of negligence, or whether we 
ought to adopt a special criterion to the meaning of negligence, or 
whether the German legislature was not aware o f  the conflict 
arising. 
THE CONCEPT OF VOLITION AND THE THEORY OF NEGATIVE INTEREST: 
Stammler and Chironi held that when two persons negotiate they 
enter into a precontract which implies an element of volition on 
the part of the initiating party to such negotiations. Although this 
theory was originally acceptable to Windscheid, he later repu­
diated it on the basis that the �bligation to make good damages, 
resulting from an abrupt and unjustifiable termination of negotia­
tions, is not the consequence of any volition at all. 
During the 'trattative precontrattuali' the parties guarantee that 
in all honesty and trust they would both seek to reach a beneficial 
conclusion. Their interest is not the positive one, of seeing a 
final contract executed, but a negative one, that their tacit pre-
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contract be not violated. This so-called 'interesse negativo' pro­
pounded by Jhering and adhered to by Torrente covers the eventual 
loss suffered by the damaged party - a loss that he would not 
have suffered had he not participated in the negotiation. 
The negative interest is also met with in German law where the 
effect of the action relating to precontractual liability is
(a) indemnification up to the limit suffered, and
(b) any other profit that could have been made during such pre­
contractual negotiations. 
A literal translation of the German text is 'interest out of the 
confidence in the contrace which is wide enough to tally with 
Cohn's words, namely, that: 'the consequence of a violation of a 
semi-contractual relation arising from the preparation of a contract 
is the duty on the part of the responsible party to compensate the 
other party for any damage caused co this party either wilfully or 
negligently' .. 
It seems fit to conclude that if the injured party is a buyer he is 
to be indemnified for the loss suffered for not having looked else­
where for the necessary merchandise, while if the injured party is 
the vendor he should be indemnified for the loss suffered in turn­
ing down other offers. 
THE FRENOI POSITION: 
The French Cour de Cassation applied the theory of 'interesse 
negacivo' in a judgement given on the 4th August 1930 on the 
basis of the following facts: Plaintiffs, several booksellers, had 
gone co the appointed place ac the specified time, in accordance 
with an advertisement in the papers for a public auction sale of 
books. No sooner had they got there than the auction was can­
celled. The court reimbursed them all travelling expenses and any 
gain these booksellers might have made if they had attended an­
other auction sale advertised for the same day. 
It will be seen that the court did not hesitate to give a wide inter­
pretation to the negative interest. 
The fact chat the French civil code contains no specific provi­
sion for the application of preconcracrual liability has not hin­
dered the Cour de Cassacion from applying it on the basis of 'abus 
de droit' or 'erreur'. 
ABUSE OF RIGHT: 
'La jurisprudence a, au contraire, toujours reconnu qu'une faute 
peut-etre commise dans l' exercise d 'un droic et donner lieu a
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!'application des articles 1382 et 1383'. 2 
Section 1382 provides: 'Tout fait quelconque de l'homme qui cause 
a autrui un dommage, oblige celui par la faute duquel il est ar­
rive' a la re parer' .. 
and section 1383 states: 'Chacun est responsable du dommage 
qu'il a cause non seulement par son fait, mais encore par sa neg­
ligence ou par son imprudence'. 
Similar to the German position we notice that both malice and 
negligence of a defendant are grounds for abuse of right and, sim­
ilarly, a basis for precontractual liability. 
In a 1972 case, the Cour de Cassation calculated the damages, 
in a successful action for precontractual liability, on the basis of 
tort. Plain tiff had gone to the USA to look at machines he was 
interested in buying fr.om the defendant. No sooner had he done 
so, after lengthy negotiations, than defendant sold them to a third 
party under a contract which prohibited him· from selling to any­
body else. The coun he Id that this was a case of J:Xecontractual 
liability for no contract whatsoever had been formed, since the 
offer was revoked before the acceptance was communicated. 
ERROR: 
A claim for precontractual damages could arise when a contract 
is annulled because of a mistake committed by one of the parties 
during the negotiating stage .. This side of the French view is 
similar to the very rigid approach taken in classical Roman Law 
where protection was unadequate because it· only gave damages 
where there was some semblance of a contract, although a void 
one. In Justinian's time, the relevant action was the actio ex 
contractu granted in case of nullity of a contract .. Culp a was con­
sidered to appertain to the stage of a completed contract. 
The Cour de Cassation in 1972 held that plaintiff was entitled 
to claim precontractual damages where a contract was annulled 
because of a mistake committed by defendant during negotiations. 
A Japanese film producer and a French distributor signed a con­
tract only to find out it was null and void because the Japanese 
defendant had failed to take the necessary steps regarding Japan­
ese exchange control regulations that were required to validitate 
the contract. 
It appears that both French and German law would benefit by the 
enactment of a specific provision regulating precontractual lia­
bility. What was said before about the meaning of the word negli­
gent in the German Code, ·would apply to the French position rela-
2 Alex Weill: Droit Civil, edition Dalloz, 1971. 
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ting to abuse of right and error. Offhand, it appears to be too 
harsh to apply precontractual damages to cases of negligence. 
THE ITALIAN POSITION: 
In 1942 the Italian legislature enacted article 1337, 'Le parti 
nello svolgimento delle trattative e nella formazione del contratto, 
devono comportarsi secondo buona fede'. 
This section has been constantly interpreted to require three 
elements, which are very neatly laid down in a judgment of the 
Corte di Cassazione of the 30th January 1976: 
(a) l' affidamento fondato su elementi obiettivi ed inequivoci, di
una delle parti nella conclusione del contratto; 
(b) il recesso dell'atto concraente senza giusta causa, cioe 
quando sia effetto di malafede o non sia determinato dal compor­
tamento dell'altra parte; 3 
(c) il danno risarcibile, consistente nel cosidetto interesse
negativo, che comprende le ·spese sostenute in provisione della 
stipula del contratto ed al.tre simili. 
There have been certain Italian judgments founding a claim for 
precontractual damages successfully based on the negligence of 
the defendant. It must be pointed out that the blanket provision 
article 2043 states, 
'Qualu nque facto doloso o colposo, che cagiona ad altri un 
danno ingiusto, obbliga colui che ha commesso il fatto a risar­
cire il danno'. 
Taking our minds back to section 1337 we realise that in spite 
of- the fact that there already was a section so wide as to cover 
cases of dolus and culpa, the Italian legislature still saw fit to in­
troduce section 1337 based on good faith and referring specifically 
to precontractual responsibility. 
A corollary duty is imposed under section 1338, which states 
that a party whe knows or who is in a position to know of the ex­
istence of any cause of invalidity is bound to inform the other 
party of the existence of such cause. The non-perfonnance of this 
obligatio.--n renders the damaging party liable for the damages 
which are eventually suffered as a result of such an omission. One 
must not reach the unfounded conclusion that this is the only 
case where pre-contractual liability arises. After all it is section 
3This implies that if the hope of reaching a favourable conclusion is
frustrated by supervening accidental causes, which make the obligation 
too onerous for one party, he would be justified in falling out o f  the 
negotiations. 
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1337 which caters for the concept and lays down a wide basis for 
the action by the words 'good faith'. 
The problem of interpretation raised by the word 'negligence' 
was seen and .provided for. It is true that the phrase 'good faith' 
is to be interpreted by the courts, but it is clear that the situation 
is more well-defined now than it was during the pre-1942 legal 
position. 
On the 5th September, 1952, the Corte di Cassazione, stated 
that the obligation of negotiating in good faith implies that there 
is no need for the court to establish a fraudulent intentiono This 
is in keeping with section 1338 because lack of deligence and 
prudence is sufficient to give rise to bad faith. However, there are 
certain judgements of the Italian supreme Court4 to the effect that 
to the obligation of any one of the negotiating parties to disclose 
a cause of invalidity corresponds that obligation of the other party 
to exercise the necessary amount of diligence, through which he 
himself would have come to know of the existence of such cause 
of invalidity. 
Glancing at the theoretical aspect of the whole matter, some 
writers consider that every negotiation has a contract in itself, 
known as the precontract. Thus as soon as we negotiate, we ere­
are a contract, the object of which is that we bind ourselves 
reciprocally to collaborate and reach a fruitful conclusion. After 
all, the law does not enumerate the number of contracts we can 
enter into, and a contract de ineundo contrac tu is a contract just 
as well. 
Other writers say that this begs the question. It extends the 
notion of contract far too much. If we admit that there must be a 
vinculum juri's in a contract, i.e. there must be an intention to 
bind oneself, what one does in reality is to endeavour to see 
whether there is a basis for a vinculum juri.-s to be created. If any­
thing, they say that one creates a quasi-contractual situation, not 
in the sense of negotiorum gestio or indebiti solutio, but in the 
sense that one's position seems to look like that of a contract. 
THE MALTESE POSITION: 
Turning to the local scene, the problem came to the fore ir1 1965 
in Giuffrida v Borg Olivier. Plaintiffs, an Italian company, had 
been negotiating with the Maltese Government for the grant of land 
4Corte di Cassazione: 9 Novembre 1956
Corte di Cassazione: 30 Maggio 1959 
Corte di Cassazione: 27 Marzo 1963 
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on emphyteusis. Defendants claimed that plaintiffs failed to com­
ply with the terms set to them, and since the Government 
refused to negotiate further it withdrew its letter of intent with re­
gard to the emphyteutical concession. 
Plaintiffs wanted the court in the first place to declare that 
they had in fact abided by all the terms set to them and secondly 
to annul the withdrawal of the letter of intent made by defendants, 
the Maltese Government. 
The First Hall of the Civil Court adopted the line that there . 
was no contract (because neither the 'exact location nor the ground 
rent, two elements necessary for the contract of emphyteusis, had 
been agreed upon) and therefore it could not go into the matter. 
But the Court of Appeal did not dismiss the case as speedily as 
the First Hall Civil Court did. It said that it could not go into the 
matter of executive discretion. It also said that it would not state 
whether the theory of precontractual responsibility was part of 
Maltese law or not. 
The sad side of the case is that if plaintiffs had claimed pre­
contractual damages we would have had a judgment on the posi­
tion at local law. We can look on the brighter side of things by 
saying that at least the Court of Appeal refused to talk about it 
and did not ignore it as the lower court did.
Four years later, in 1969, the case of Pullen v Matysik arose. 
Plaintiff sued the Manager of the �alta Hilton for damages after 
the defendant told him that it would be possible for plaintiff to 
move into a boutique at the Hilton Hotel after Hertz, the former 
tenants, wanted to terminate the contract of lease. Instead of al­
lowing Hertz to look for an alternative tenant, Matysik entered into 
precontractual negotiations with Pullen, who was in India at the 
time. On the pretext that Hertz wanted to terminate the lease, 
Matysik advised Pullen to come to Malta. However, no agreement 
was signed regarding the verbal agreement for a four year lease 
between Pullen and Matysik and no sooner had plaintiff come to 
Malta than Hertz said he did not after all wane to leave the bou­
tique unless Pullen bought the stock of clothes he had left over. 
After Pullen agreed to do so Hertz nevertheless decided to con­
tinue with the lease. 
Therefore Pullen sued Matysik for damages and defendant asked 
the court to bring Hertz into the suit as well. The Court agreed to 
such demand. 
The First Hall Civil Court said that there was no contract 
formed because a lease for an urban tenement of four years re­
quires a written agreement ad validitatem and not merely ad pro-
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bationem tantum. 5. Since no such agreement existed it could de­
finitely not be a case of contractual responsibility and therefore 
the liability to pay compensation arises from the degree of atten­
tion that each party assumes even during the precontractual stagea 
There was no express mention of the doctrine by the judge, but it 
was clearly implied. In fact the damages that were awarded were 
restricted 'to the actual losses they incurred up to the time that 
the negotiations broke down ••• and are not to include any profits 
which plaintiffs would have derived from the concession of the 
boutique, as in this way they would be benefitting from an obliga­
tion which never came into existence.' 
It ought to be pointed out that the restricted award of damages 
was an implication of the theory under discussion, for in both con­
tracts and torts the amount of damages that is awarded is un­
restricteda 
It is true that section 1088 of our Civil Code provides for 'the 
loss of actual wages or other earnings', which is what Pullen also 
demanded as the profit he would have made if he were given the 
four year lease of the boutique. But our law, through section 1088, 
caters for cases when persons are physically injured or killed and 
thus prevented from· working according to their respective ability. 
It would be wrong if our courts were to apply this section to tally 
with the meaning of 'damages' as understood in precontractual 
responsibility. 
The problems met with in relation to the word 'negligence' arise 
here too, for the Court declared both Matysik and Hertz liable 
equally: the former because he was negligent in not realising what 
legal consequence would arise if he could not eventually give 
Pullen the shop on lease, and the latter because he acted in bad 
faith when he capriciously withdrew from the negotiations and re­
fused to terminate the lease even after Pullen agreed to buy over 
his stock of clothes. 
At no time did the judge expressly mention that the theory of 
precontractual liability is part of Maltese law. But because it was 
implied, mainly through the amount of damages awarded, certain 
lawyers and students might conclude, from what the Court had to 
say, that negligence, as well as bad faith, would constitute the 
basis for the action, if ever incorporated expressly into our lawa 
Whether such a point of view is adopted or not, it still remains 
evident that the line between negligence and bad faith is a very 
thin one indeed. The writer suggests that the Maltese legislature 
5 Section 1277 ( l)(e) Maltese Civil Code.
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should follow the path chosen in 1942 by the Italian Parliament. 
This would not only give our courts the push they seem to need to 
recognise and apply the doctrine, but it would also lay down 'good 
faith', a very sound basis, as a guide to the criteria the courts 
would look to. 
It seems up to now that a main reason for the lack of interest by 
our judiciary in the concept of culpa in contrahendo may be at­
tributed to the fact that it might infringe the freedom pertaining to 
the parties in the 'negotiation' stage. If applied with caution, how­
ever, the theory would, on the contrary, enhance the principle of 
the liberty of contracting, for society must have some form of 
protection against dishonest traders. 
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